Of Correct Views on Law Without the State by Schultz, Thomas
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1093/jnlids/idv003
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Schultz, T. (2015). Of Correct Views on Law Without the State. Journal of International Dispute Settlement, 6(1),
2-3. 10.1093/jnlids/idv003
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 18. Feb. 2017
Of Correct Views on Law Without The State 
Thomas Schultz 
Editorial, Journal of International Dispute Settlement, vol 6, issue 1, 2015 
Version of record accessible here: http://jids.oxfordjournals.org/content/6/1/2.full.pdf+html 
 
Law without the state is a vexed topic for dispute settlement theorists, and for some 
practitioners too. It is also an important topic, in that it helps us understand what dispute 
settlement is all about, at least from a 30’000 thousand foot view, and what relationships it 
entertains with the idea of law. Over the decades innumerable attempts have been made to tell 
us what the correct view on this question is. But what if there is no correct view? 
 
Let me begin from the beginning. In many part of the world, state borders are increasingly 
less relevant. This is not only so for commercial transactions and arrangements, but also for 
the way we think of ourselves, and thus for our allegiances and for the rules we believe we 
should obey. It’s probably rarely been the case since the 17th century that we orient our 
behaviour so much according to transnational rules – rules that, like clouds and pollution, like 
economic transactions and crises, have little regard for the imagined communities we call 
nations. 
 
Yet most of us lawyers continue as if nothing happened; as if these developments were the 
problem of economists, sociologists, political scientists, and soon historians, but not really the 
problem of lawyers; as if the only thing it really is appropriate for lawyers to think about is 
what happens in court (national and international); as if we had to take instructions from 
states about what law is and, in return, help states determine what that law exactly says; as if 
our students could have no other calling than to engage in a trade that, ultimately, revolves 
around what states and their courts do; as if we had no other choice, when thinking about law, 
than to think about what states undertake; as if the frontiers of legal thinking had to match the 
political borders of states.  
 Not that states are unimportant politically and socially. They can do things, good and bad, no 
one else can. But to give them the power to constrain what intellectuals in law can think about 
when they think about law and teach law: that is a different story entirely. Yet it is a story we 
tell ourselves quite often. And when we do, we usually skip the first chapter, in which we see 
the hero of the story (that would be ourselves, the lawyers) granting states the monopoly of 
law-making. For indeed that first chapter could have been written differently. The relationship 
between society and law does not have to be a relationship between society and states, 
between society and nations. It is only the way we lawyers usually want to think about it. 
 
Strangely enough, perhaps, a great challenge we lawyers face today in our attempts to grapple 
with our changing, “transnationalising” world, lies within ourselves. A great new frontier of 
transnational law is indeed introspective, or “reflexive” as our jargon would have it. It starts 
with the realisation that law is whatever we call law. There is nothing inherent in law that 
makes law law. We could call law whatever set of rules a community gives itself. It could be 
a qualified version of this idea, for instance only those rules that embody certain basic human 
right ideals. Or it could be whatever the ruling power says it is. We are all potential Humpty 
Dumpties. There is nothing inherent in law that makes it only creatable by states. Law is 
whatever we want to call law. This means we have a choice.  
 
We have a choice about how we want to define what we lawyers are supposedly competent to 
talk about: law. And it seems to be empirically true (I don’t think this has ever been properly 
studied) that most people believe they should, in general, obey the law, that it is, on most 
occasions, morally better to follow the law than to break it. If that is indeed true, isn’t it 
possibly meaningful what we do call law? 
 
The problem with this choice, for us lawyers, is that we can’t answer it based on… the law. 
So we have to reach out beyond the traditional frontiers of our discipline to look for answers. 
And what we find there is, again, foreign to the natural habitat of the lawyer: there are a 
number of possible answers to the question of what it might be appropriate to call law. Some 
are better, some are worse. Different answers, different ways to understand what law is, 
empower different actors (by giving them law-making powers), and thus advance different 
interests. The less states have the monopoly of law-making, the more interests other than state 
interests are likely to be advanced. As a consequence, there are incentives for certain 
understandings of law to be pushed, and socio-professional constraints put in the way of 
others.  
 
All of this is, as I said, fairly foreign to lawyers. It is also so because it forces us to see that 
there aren’t simply right and wrong answers, and that several understandings of what law is 
can validly coexist at the same time. It calls on us to practice intellectual pluralism. Let me 
tell a story to explain this. 
 
Two individuals call on a rabbi to resolve their dispute. The rabbi listens closely to the first 
person, and finally says “you are right”. The second individual launches into a detailed 
repartee, defending the exact opposite view. “You are right too”, the rabbi enthusiastically 
responds. The rabbi’s wife, who had overheard the discussions, sighs, and admonishes her 
husband: “you can’t say that they are both right!”. The rabbi thinks about it for a while and 
answers “you, my dear wife, are right too.” 
